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Abstract:  
This independent study will look to analyze the various strategies that Russia has pursued in 
regaining international influence since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Specifically, 
it will consider how Russia has attempted to utilize its close proximity to the Middle East, to 
implement change in the region to further advance its own agenda. The areas of focus will 
include Russia’s military strategy, trade developments, and manipulation of soft power to 
nourish positive perception of Russia within the region.  
 
Introduction: 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a new era of international relations, 
dominated by the unilateral might of the United States. The great Communist state had finally 
collapsed, making way for a new world order in which Russia was all but irrelevant. Their 
political system was overthrown, their ideology was defeated, and their economy was in 
shambles. By 1991, the economy was in such a recession that it had contracted over 17 percent 
and consumer conflation had reached 140 percent . The new Russia, attempting to develop as a 1
democracy, did not threaten U.S. interests and remained relatively extraneous as this new era 
unfolded.  
1 ​Hailes, Theodore C., and Air University . Center for Strategy Technology. ​Resurgent Russia in 2030 Challenge for 
the USAF​. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air U, 2009. 
Occasional Paper (Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology) ; No. 66. P. 28 
Times have changed since then. Now, many scholars are examining a new scenario, one 
in which Russia regains its presence on the international stage. Stunning economic growth since 
1998, during which the ruble all but crashed, has now transitioned into startling increases that 
have led to a GDP growth of $1,312 in 1999 to $8,842 in 2007.  According to one report, experts 2
now say that “at some time in the next 20–40 years, Russia will re emerge as a world power”.  3
While some authors quibble about dates, there are few who argue about the eventual outcome. 
The idea of a “Resurgent Russia” is quite prominent now, as Russia dominates more and more of 
the daily news. Pertinent to this writing is the Kremlin’s interest in the Middle East, and how it 
has utilized its newfound power to extrapolate on the current situations occurring around its 
borders.  
As Russia’s economic and political influence has grown over the last few decades, the 
Kremlin’s focus has shifted once again towards the Middle East amongst other critical regions. 
Today, Russia’s interest “in Middle Eastern affairs today is the most active it has been since the 
heyday of the Cold War.”  Thus far, the Kremlin has mainly grown its influence via military 4
presence, trade deals, and soft power through agreements with various Middle Eastern leaders. 
The most poignant example of such military presence came in 2015 when Russia decisively 
committed itself to the Syrian civil war. Russia’s involvement has become its biggest combat 
employment since the Soviet-Afghan War, ambitiously launched despite not sharing a common 
2 Oliker, et al. “United States Should Tailor Its Russia Policy to Build on Shared Views and Interests.” ​RAND 
Corporation​, 2 Mar. 2009, p. 1. www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG768.html. 
3 ​Hailes, Theodore C., and Air University. Pg. 1. 
4 ​United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Middle East North Africa, 
Russia's Strategic Objectives in the Middle East and North Africa : Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth 
Congress, First Session, June 15, 2017.​ Washington: U.S. Government Office, 2017. P. 9. 
border or having any kind of large independent support . While there was some vested national 5
security interest involved, specifically in preventing “battle hardened Russian jihadists”  from 6
returning home if the state failed, it is apparent to most in the international system that Russia’s 
involvement was entirely meant to demonstrate their renewed power. This marks the first direct 
intervention by both the United States and Russia in a military conflict with both countries 
putting troops on the ground, heightening tensions to a level that has been noticeably absent for 
several decades. While some have claimed that the Kremlin’s involvement could lead to another 
“quagmire”, Putin’s decision demonstrably brought Russia back into the lens of the international 
system. This paper will address Russia’s presence in Syria, as well as other military ventures that 
it has pursued including military bases abroad such as in Syria (and it’s willingness to use other 
nation’s military bases ) and its own internal development of its military for foreign deployment. 7
 
Literature Review:  
The existing literature on great power rise and fall has a tendency to focus on the rise of 
new states and the fall of dying states. What it does not do, however, is that it fails to analyze the 
manner in which states “resurge” or return as a player in the international system. The literature 
on the topic of resurgent states is heavily limited despite the presence of such vernacular in 
newspaper articles and scholarly journals. The definition of a resurgent state and the manner in 
5 ​Trenin, Dmitri. What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Polity Press, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/conncoll/detail.action?docID=5145619​. P. 31 
6 ​Ibid. P. 37. 
7 This is in reference to Russia’s utilization of Iran’s Hamadan airbase in 2017 to strike targets in Syria and its 
agreement with Egypt which has effectively allowed Russia access to Egypt’s bases.  
Sly, Liz. “In the Middle East, Russia Is Back.” ​The Washington Post​, WP Company, 5 Dec. 2018, 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-the-middle-east-russia-is-back/2018/12/04/e899df30-aaf1-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff
902_story.html?utm_term=.038bdb76431f. 
which states attempt to regain strength is rarely crystallized and remains more of a generalized 
concept than a concrete analysis. Specifically, although scholars have acknowledged the growing 
strength of Russia, there is a gap in the literature on the foreign policy initiatives that the Kremlin 
has implemented to attempt to reclaim great power status. Although seminal theories do not 
explicitly explain resurgent power, they remain instrumental in understanding the general 
process of power transitions. This literature review will first outline the seminal arguments on 
great power rise and fall and then it will seek to outline how these arguments might extend to 
resurgent states.  
 
International Relations Theory: 
In understanding great power politics, it is essential to first understand the world in which 
states operate. Over time, different schools of thought have developed distinct models for 
analyzing states’ behavior and intentions. Such models allow political scientists to explain why 
states pursue one policy or another and the manner in which they interact with other states.  
One of the most central and longstanding schools of thought is the notion of Realism. 
Underlying this theory is the reality that anarchy remains the most defining feature of the 
international system in the absence of a supranational government. Such emphasis on anarchy is 
typically most associated with Realist thought, since Realism assumes that the world is driven by 
insecurity. Realist theory contends that the condition of anarchy makes security the first and 
foremost concern of states. Mearsheimer, one of the most well known scholars on the topic, 
writes that the first assumption of the international system is anarchic, although notes that this 
should be taken to mean that it is chaotic or disorderly. Rather, it is an ordering principle 
communicating the fact that the system is comprised of independent states that have no central 
authority above them.  The international system “never was and is not today a world state” as 8
stated by George Modelski, who claims that the system is a decentralized polity.  Lacking this 9
higher authority, states are left to their own devices to protect and defend themselves from other, 
potentially hostile forces.  
The term ‘realism’ tends to denote a pessimistic vision of the future, with little 
expectation of states changing their nature. Realism, as noted by Edward Carr, emphasizes the 
irresistible strength of existing forces, insisting that wisdom lies in accepting and adapting to 
these tendencies, rather than attempting to alter them.  At realism’s core is the notion that 10
international affairs is nothing more than a struggle for power between competing, self interested 
states.  This struggle for power is considered to be universal, temporally and spatially, 11
regardless of social, economic, and political conditions.   12
Not all schools of thought maintain such a forlorn outlook on the international states of 
affairs. Liberals tend to be hopeful about the prospects of creating a safer, more interconnected 
world. They purport a vision of a future without war, assuming that states can overcome their 
differences to work together. Liberals claim that the world is on a slow but “inexorable journey 
away from the anarchic world” arguing that trade and finance will forge relationships between 
nations, and democratic norms will spread.”  Liberalism emphasizes a drive towards global 13
markets, international organizations, cooperation. The championing minds behind such an 
8 Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. P. 338 
9 Modelski, George. ​Principles of World Politics​. New York: Free, 1972. P. 216 
10 Carr, Edward Hallett. ​The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; an Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations​. London: Macmillan and, Limited, 1940. P. 10. 
11 ​Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. P. 6. 
12 ​Morgenthau, Hans J. ​Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace​. P. 17. 
13 ​Ibid. P. 7. 
ideology include John Locke and Immanuel Kant, convinced that states could put aside their 
differences to create some of the international governing bodies that exist today. Today, the 
scholars of liberalism envision an interconnected future in which states remain individual and 
sovereign, but can also cooperate through a system of shared ideals and norms for the betterment 
of all people.  
A third body of literature is often discussed in terms of international politics, namely 
constructivism. A constructivist mind sees international politics as the product of persuasive 
ideas, cultural effects, and historical relationships to understand the current state of affairs. 
According to constructivism, ideas always maintain importance, because power and interest are 
intrinsically related to the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such.”  In essence, the 14
world is a social construction made from the actions and beliefs of human beings. As Alexander 
Wendt explains, the analysis of the social constructions in international politics is to analyze 
interactions and the processes that these interactions produce and reproduce. These social 
structures shape actors’ identities and interests, as well as the significance of their material 
context.  Constructivism acknowledges the international system as anarchical, but claims that it 15
is what states do within the context of that system that is most important.  
While the latter two fields offer valuable insights into how the international system 
works, I will argue in this paper that realism retains the most relevance in understanding states’ 
motives. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, in which scholars heralded the “The End of 
History”  and the inevitable triumph of liberal capitalist democracy, conflict endures. Kant’s 16
14 ​Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." ​International Security​ 20.1 (1995): 73. 
15 ​Ibid. P. 81. 
16 ​Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" ​The National Interest​ 16 (1989): 3-18. 
perpetual peace has failed to come to fruition.  As Mearsheimer bluntly stated, “Alas, the claim 17
that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the 
international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting 
peace among the great powers was stillborn.”  Mearsheimer, one of the most highly regarded 18
scholars in the field of realism, poignantly sums up this tragic inevitability in his seminal work, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. ​Mearsheimer writes that hopes for peace will probably not 
be realized due to the reality that great powers, fearing each other, are fated to clash for 
advantage over one another… He acknowledges the tragic irony of this situation but affirms that 
this scenario is bound to continue indefinitely.   19
Within Realism, there is a further differentiation that seek to account for the nature of the 
international structure. One group of thought pursues a notion of defensive realism. This 
argument, advanced by political scientists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz claims 
that states are not inherently aggressive, rather that their primary motives are survival and 
security.  Such a case purports that the preservation of balance is an intrinsic objective for most 20
states. Hans Morgenthau distinguishes between status quo states, those states who desire to 
simply exist within the system as it is, and revisionist powers who look to change the 
international system.  However, it is important to note that even while Morgenthau admits to the 21
presence of revisionist states, this is only a temporary status that is resolved once equilibrium is 
reinstated. Some scholars, such as Timofey Bordachev  and Randall Schweller,  explain 22 23
17 ​Kant, Immanuel. ​Perpetual Peace​. New York: Columbia UP, 1939. 
18 Mearsheimer, John J. ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​. P. 1-2.  
19 ​Ibid. P. xi-xii.  
20 ​Waltz, Kenneth N. ​Theory of International Politics​. 1st ed. Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
21 ​Morgenthau, Hans J. ​Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace​. 4th ed. New York: Knopf, 1967.  
22 ​Bordachev, Timofey, “«Две войны» Запада и Россия”, Россия в глобальной политике, 11 July 2018, 
https://globalaffairs.ru/number/Dve-voiny-Zapada-i-Rossiya-19666 
Russia’s rise in such a lense. These authors argue that Russia is not a dangerous revisionist state, 
rather that it is working well within the international framework to develop as a nation without 
objectives to destabilize the international order.  
This argument is not accepted by all realist scholars. Other scholars, such as John 
Mearsheimer  and Robert Gilpin,  represent another group of thought, that of offensive realism. 24 25
This theory agrees upon the principle of security being paramount, however, it diverts from that 
of defensive realism in that the two arguments conflict over the question of how much power 
states want. Mearsheimer’s ideology states that status quo powers rarely, if ever, exist in the 
international system, because states are constantly attempting to maximize their relative power 
so as to improve their security. The moment these states have the ability to alter the balance of 
power in favor of themselves, these states will take advantage of the opportunity to act. Thus 
offensive realism forwards the idea that the maximization of power is what states seek, not 
simply status quo. In thinking about Russia, it is clear that the model of offensive Realism is 
much better suited as a model in explaining Russia’s great power ambitions. Such an argument is 
supported by Russian scholars, who view Russia’s aggressive actions in the 21st century as a 
pursuit for great power ambitions through offensive, expansionist foreign policy.  In particular, 26
scholars have noted Russia’s offensive actions in the Middle East. This case study is explicative 
23 ​Schweller, Randall, “Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders”, Valdai Club, May 2015, 
http://valdaiclub.com/files/11391/ 
24 ​Mearsheimer, John J. ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​. New York: Norton, 2001. 
25 ​Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981.  
26 ​Such arguments are defended by scholars including Wood, Andrew “Putin and Russia in 2018-24.” ​The Royal 
Institute for International Affairs​ (2018): 1-23; ​Trenin, Dmitri. What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Polity 
Press, 2017; ​Reshetnikov, Anatoly,“​What Does Russia Mean When It Talks Greatness?​” E-International Relations. 
20 May 2018. ​https://www.e-ir.info/2018/05/20/what-does-russia-mean-when-it-talks-greatness/​. 
of the offensive realist perspective, and offers a clear example of Russia’s attempts at regaining 
great power. 
General Theories on the changes in the International System: 
To understand the changes (and continuities) of great power politics, one must 
understand the international system in which states operate. Gilpin explains that the international 
system exists for reasons similar to any social or political system, in that the actors enter social 
relationships and create structures to advance their political or economic interests.  The overall 27
system typically reflects the interests of the most powerful members within the social system. 
Thus, according to Gilpin,  the international system begins in a state of equilibrium or stability, 28
that is, under the presumption that no state believes that it is profitable to change the system. 
Change occurs when a state believes that the expected benefits will exceed the expected costs, 
through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change 
are either equal to or greater than the marginal benefits. Equilibrium is established, although 
Gilpin notes that there is a tendency for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise 
faster than the economic capacity of supporting the status quo, thereby often resulting in 
disequilibrium. Change in the international system will continue until a new equilibrium is 
established, reflecting a new redistribution of powers. Gilpin’s argument is interpreted by John 
Ikenberry who writes that the main cause of cyclical change occurs when there is an inevitable 
shift of power from the core to the periphery. As this shift occurs, hierarchical structures break 
27 ​Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. P. 9. 
28 Ibid. P. 10-11.  
down and competition ensues.  In essence, the systemic change refers to the replacement of a 29
declining power by the rise of another new dominant power. 
Other scholars profess a different world theory. George Modelski studies the cyclical 
patterns of world politics in his work, ​Principles of World Politics. ​Modelski defines a cycle as 
“a recurrent pattern in the life (or functioning) of a system.”  He further qualifies it by stating 30
that if the recurrence takes place in a pattern that is predictable, such behavior can then be 
labelled as cyclical or periodic.  Modelski identifies consistent variables in each world cycle, 31
noting the presence of a period of weak organization that dissolves into global war,  that then 32
gives way to a new world order organized under a peace settlement. He finds that this settlement 
endures for approximately a generation at which point this structure again begins to break down 
and competitors begin to vie again for a new world order that favors the challengers in a more 
advantageous manner.   33
When discussing the international system or a world order, political scientists also 
observe the polarity of the system, referring to the number of Great Powers that are influencing 
the system. In reality, many countries are constantly influencing the international system at any 
given time, therefore it might be argued that the world is intrinsically multipolar. While there is 
validity in this statement, the variety of polarity systems is widely recognized. For example, 
preceding World War 1, the world was seen as a multipolar system, as the Concert of Europe 
dominated the international system between several competing states. The beginning of the Cold 
29 ​Ikenberry, G. John. ​Power, Order, and Change in World Politics​. P. 19.  
30 ​Modelski, George. ​Principles of World Politics​. New York: Free, 1972. P. 214. 
31 ​Ibid. P. 214. 
32 ​Modelski defines global wars as “conflicts that determine the constitution of the global political system'; 
wide-ranging and far-reaching in their consequences, they may last over a period of a generation, and in the end they 
give birth to a new world order.” P. 217 
33 Ibid. P. 217.  
War ushered in a period of bipolarity, in which countries gravitated to the United States and the 
ideals of liberal democracy or to the USSR and the ideology of Communism. Following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, many scholars heralded the age of American unipolarity. 
Different systems entail different security considerations. For example, Mearsheimer claims that 
multipolar systems are more war prone than bipolar systems for several reasons. He explains that 
in a multipolar world, there are more opportunities for war as there are more potential conflict 
dyads. Furthermore, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world resulting 
in great powers having a greater ability to win a war, thus making deterrence more difficult. 
Finally, the potential for miscalculation increases and states are more apt to make rash decisions 
without careful consideration of the effects of war.  Bipolar systems, as the name implies, are 34
considered to be the most balanced as the two major forces only have to consider the motives 
and objectives of one main opposition. Finally, unipolarity is considered to be the least stable of 
all structures, since any great concentration of power threatens the security of others and results 
in such states working to restore a balance.  Therefore, it is the system least often encountered 35
and the moment of unipolarity often passes away hastily.  
Today, there is much evidence to claim that this moment has indeed passed for the United 
States. The rise of China and the resurgence of Russia point to the potential of impending 
conflict as the United States attempts to retain its position of power. Although neither China nor 
Russia (or any other state for that matter) possess nearly the same economic or military might as 
the United States, their growing strength is nonetheless a reality. Another bipolar situation 
between the United States and Russia is unlikely given the current state of Russia, as well as the 
34 Mearsheimer, John J. ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​. P. 5  
35 ​Wohlforth, William. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." ​International Security​ 24.1 (1999): 5. 
number of other states that possess nuclear capabilities. Scholars are also skeptical about the 
concept of a multipolar future, as nonstate actors have taken on just as important a role in 
international affairs as states. One scholar, Richard Haas, has even gone as far as to predict a 
nonpolar future arguing that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power thus defeating the 
concept of a state driven international system.  Therefore, in considering Russia’s expansionist 36
tendencies today, it is more likely that it is an attempt to simply acquire more relative power 
from its competitors rather than an indication of total hegemony. Keeping in mind that this is 
always the long term goal of any state, Russia’s actions now seem to indicate a more short term, 
practical objective of regaining its status as a relevant and important international actor. 
 
Objectives of States: 
This segues into understanding what the primary objectives of states are. Mearsheimer 
claims that the overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power by pursuing 
the status of regional or global hegemony,  a concept that will be explained momentarily. 37
Specifically, Mearsheimer argues that states pursue this objective by gaining power at the 
expense of other states.  Of course, states must consider the relative nature of the international 38
system. All measures of power are contingent on the power of the states around them. As Gilpin 
writes, the abundance or security of a nation’s power and riches matters little if it’s neighbor 
possesses more.  Due to the fact that power is relative, the rise or decline of one state by 39
definition entails the decline or rise of another. Thus states must take into account the manner in 
36 Haass, Richard. "The Age of Nonpolarity." ​Foreign Affairs​ 87, no. 3 (2008): 44-56. 
37 Ibid.​ ​141. 
38 Ibid. P. 2 
39 ​Kennedy, Paul M. ​The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000​. New York, NY: Random House, 1988. P. xxii.  
which they can advance their own strength to lessen their neighbors. Mearsheimer elaborates, 
arguing that states look for opportunities to alter the balance of power in their favor by obtaining 
increments of power, whether through economic, diplomatic, or military means in a zero sum 
fashion.  This security dilemma, as it is commonly referred to as, is explained concisely by John 40
Herz. Herz writes that as strates strive to attain security from neighboring attacks, they are driven 
to acquire more and more power to better protect themselves. This, in turn, renders the opposing 
powers to become more insecure in comparison. Thus, power competition ensues, and the 
“vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”  Waltz theorizes that states’ first and 41
foremost concern is to maintain their position in the system.  Gilpin too agrees that states first 42
look to secure themselves in the international system. Once the position of the state is ascertained 
in the international system, Gilpin would argue that the second objective of states is to maximize 
their influence over the behavior of rival states whether through threats, coercion, alliances, or 
exclusive spheres of influence. This behavior allows states to create an international environment 
of which they design the rules of the system. This system is made to be conducive to the 
fulfillment of the state’s political, economic, and ideological interests.  This follows in tandem 43
with Gilpin’s other understanding of states’ objectives, that is to influence the world economy 
and the international division of labor in an advantageous manner.  44
Many scholars argue that the ultimate goal of states is to become a hegemon. Scholars 
define hegemony as “the leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states in the system.”  45
40 Ibid. P. 34. 
41 ​Herz, John H. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." ​World Politics​ 2.2 (1950): 157 
42 ​Waltz, Kenneth N. ​Theory of International Politics​. P. 126. 
43 ​Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. P. 24  
44 Ibid. P. 24.  
45 Ibid. P. 116.  
Mearsheimer classifies hegemons as the sole great power in the system.  He further dilineates 46
by stating that such a power should be so distinguished from its peers that no other state would 
have the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it.  Scholars note a distinction 47
between global hegemons, those powers who dominate the entire international system, and 
regional hegemons, those which dominate distinct geographical areas.  The United States, for 48
example, is and has been a regional hegemon because it remains unchallenged for superiority by 
other countries in the northern hemisphere. All other states, therefore, either aim to achieve this 
status, or to surpass it by becoming the strongest player in the international system.  
 
Great Power Status: 
Although nations aspire to be hegemons, more often states reach the title of “Great 
power.” Scholars vary broadly on how they choose to label a state as a great power. Power itself 
is a difficult concept to quantify. As acknowledged by Levy, many scholars have chosen either 
not to attempt to define the concept or have made little to no effort to translate ambiguous 
concepts into meaningful operational criteria.  Robert L. Rothstein, for example, suggests that 49
the lack of a clear definition could be due to the commonly held belief that such a distinction 
between Great Powers and other, weaker states is self-evident, therefore not requiring exact 
quantitative variables.  Waltz makes a similar comment, making a comparison between 50
counting the number of great powers in an era to counting how many major firms populate an 
46 ​Mearsheimer, John J. ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​.  P. 2 
47 Ibid. P. 97. 
48 Ibid. P. 97. 
49 ​Levy, Jack S. ​War in the Modern Great Power System​. UP of Kentucky, 2015. P. 10. 
50 ​Rothstein, Robert L., and Columbia University. Institute of War Peace Studies. ​Alliances and Small Powers​. New 
York: Columbia UP, 1968. ​P. 14. 
oligopolistic sector of an economy.  His argument is that an understanding of great power status 51
often comes from common sense but can be difficult to quantify. Scholars also contend with 
when a Great Power has successfully reached the status of greatness necessary for qualification 
into the “common sense” grouping. It seems apparent that it is more of a general process rather 
than the result of a specific or single event. Some scholars only consider changes over the course 
of one century to another.  Other scholars such as Michael Haas constructed a set of entry and 52
departure dates that were instrumental in formulating system transformation over the last three 
centuries.  Most often, these dates correlate to the end of a decisive war for the aforementioned 53
reasons of military capability being so crucial in great power status. Again, it is more frequently 
correlated with long term development and noticeable economic shifts rather than a specific date 
that demarcated a great power’s status. 
Over time, scholars have attempted to identify the markers of state power and the 
variables that contribute to this power. In Gilpin’s work, he defines the power of a state simply in 
terms of the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states.  E.H. Carr, on the other 54
hand, focuses on a nation's “power of opinion”, referring to the intangible psychological aspects 
of powers within international relations.  Modelski characterizes great or world powers as those 55
that control or substantially control the global political system. According to Modelski, these 
powers do not control national or local political systems or processes, rather the identity, values, 
and resources of that power shape the international system.  Mearsheimer states that power 56
51 ​Waltz, Kenneth N. ​Theory of International Politics​. P. 131. 
52 ​Wright, Quincy. ​A Study of War​. Chicago, Ill.: U of Chicago, 1942. P. 649.  
53 ​Haas, Michael. "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity." ​The American Political Science Review​ 64.1 
(1970): 102.  
54 ​Gilpin, Robert. ​War and Change in World Politics​. P. 13-14 
55 ​Carr, Edward Hallett. ​The New Society.​ London: Macmillan, 1951. P. 132 
56 ​Modelski, George. ​Principles of World Politics​. New York: Free, 1972. P. 216 
represents nothing other than the specific assets or material resources that are available to the 
country, however the actual practical use of that power is a state’s ability to force another to do 
something in accordance to the first power’s desires.  Other variables such as leadership, 57
strategic ability, regime type, etc., are considered integral to power by other scholars. For 
example, Henry Kissinger once claimed, “Military muscle does not guarantee political influence. 
Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure 
economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military 
nor economic strength.”   58
 
Explanatory Variables of Great Power: 
Each of these aforementioned definitions of great power are largely theoretical. However, 
scholars have also made an effort to identify and label certain explanatory variables which 
separate Great Powers from their weaker counterparts. As previously stated, military power is 
often the primary characteristic of a Great Power. Indeed, the majority of scholars most directly 
correlate Great power status with military might. For example, Alan Taylor argues that the test of 
a Great Power is their preparation for war.  David Singer and Thomas Cusack further this notion 59
by claiming that the most apparent attribute of a great power is its ability to wage war at frequent 
intervals with a high success rate.  Hans Morgenthau claims that armed strength as a threat or a 60
57 ​Mearsheimer, John J. ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics​. P. 57 
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potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation.”61
Leopold Ranke purported that a Great Power must have the capability to fight against any other 
power, even if they are united,  although several scholars have since criticized the claim as 62
being too sweeping in terms of its criterion. Levy counters Ranke’s definition, arguing that it is 
too exclusionary.  The conversation has continued with the introduction of new authors who 63
have modified Ranke’s concept. For example, Michael Hass rectifies the original definition by 
stating that a Great Power should not be defeated in battle by another single power, however, a 
combination of other powers could defeat said Great Power.  Although this definition does not 64
wholly clarify the ambiguity of great statehood, it does more fairly acknowledge the role that 
many powers play in the world stage today. To understand the relationship between multiple 
existing Great Powers, Martin Wight quantifies a Great Power as one that could take on another 
Great power in single combat.  Mearsheimer argues that the qualification of a great power is 65
dependent on a state possessing sufficient military assets to challenge the most powerful state in 
the system in an all out conventional war. He modifies this by saying that the candidate does not 
need to win, however, it must have some reasonable prospect of creating a war of attrition that 
leaves the dominant state severely weakened.  Rothstein takes the position that a Great Power 66
has the luxury of relying on its own capabilities to provide for its security, whereas small powers 
must rely on external alliances and international institutions.  Similarly, Stanley Hoffman argues 67
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Great Powers provide for their security without severely undermining their independence as 
opposed to small powers which are forced to choose between security and autonomy.  68
That being said, scholars consider other variables beyond pure military might, as well as 
the variables that contribute to such strength. Rob de Wijk characterises a country’s power by its 
population size, territory, economy, military apparatus, technology, and political and strategic 
culture.  Mearsheimer defines a subset of state power, identified as latent power. Latent power 69
refers to the societal resources available to states that can be utilized to build military forces. The 
most important examples of these resources, according to Mearsheimer, are the size of a state’s 
population and the wealth of the nation.  He distinguishes latent wealth from mobilizable 70
wealth, which he defines as “the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military 
forces.”  These resources must be immediately available for defense expenditure as the name 71
implies. Waltz claims that the rank of a nation depends on a variety of factors including the size 
of their population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence.  Population size has long been considered a critical element 72
to great power status because according to some scholars, only large populations can produce 
great wealth which is the building block of military power.  Wealth is important because money 73
and technology are essential in equipping, training, and modernizing a state’s fighting forces. 
Furthermore, the cost of waging great power wars are enormous...Accordingly, the great powers 
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in the international system are invariably among the world’s wealthiest states.  This is further 74
supported by Davis and North who claim that a steady rate of economic growth, as well as a 
noticeable population shift might be the most significant cause of political change over a long 
period of time.  Paul Kennedy’s study of Great Powers find a clear connection in the long run 75
between an individual Great Powers economic rise its growth as an important military power.  76
For example, Kennedy considers the move in trade flows from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic 
and northwestern Europe from the 16th century forward, finding that such an economic shift 
“heralded the rise of new Great Powers which would one day have a decisive impact upon the 
military/territorial order.”   77
 
Russian Great Power: 
The story of Russian Great Power is typically traced to the reign of Peter the Great whose 
unification and modernization of the country catapulted the nation’s rise.  Jack Levy goes as far 78
as to mark 1721 as a watershed year, marking Russia’s entrance into the modern great power 
system.  Other authors, such as Iver Neumann, mark Russia’s attainment of great power status 79
as following the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.  While dates are debated its indisputable that the 80
Russian state has been instrumental in international history. Its vast geography, in addition to its 
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sizable population and economic stature marked Russia as a main competitor in international 
politics up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 1990s in Russia were marked by extreme 
recession, in terms of economy and military strength. GDP growth remained in the negative for 
almost the entire decade as inflation soared and incomes plummeted.  In the military sector, 81
weapons spending in 1992 was around 75% less than in 1988 and almost all of Russia’s arms 
production had paused.  Its status as a “Great Power” seemed to wane as internal problems 82
overrode the states’ ability to exert itself on the international stage.  
In general, scholars account for great power decline by identifying several factors. Most 
pertinent to a state’s decline is its economic situation. Gilpin supports this statement, arguing that 
that “perhaps the most significant changes that undermine the power of the dominant state are 
structural changes in its economy.”  Economic stagnation results in the erosion of military 83
strength, economic inefficiency, and decline in military and economic competitiveness.  84
Ikenberry extracts five specific processes from Gilpin’s research:the declining rates of economic 
growth; rising costs of the military; the tendency for public and private consumption to increase; 
the trend of economic activity to transition to services; and the “corrupting influence of 
affluence.”  Each of these variables erode the state’s ability to maintain dominance or 85
hegemony. Most specifically, a country’s power begins to decline when it begins to divert its 
resources away from productive investment and instead towards system maintenance and 
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protection. Paul Kennedy argues that “Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by 
spending more on ‘security,’ and thereby divert potential resources from ‘investment’ and 
compound their long-term dilemma.”  In exerting more resources on system maintenance, states 86
inherently compromise economic growth. It becomes more difficult to generate the necessary 
revenue for protection costs, while at the same time protection costs rise in tandem. The 
preservation of status quo dominance becomes more tenuous and eventually the international 
system enters a state of disequilibrium. According to Gilpin, “disequilibrium entails a disjuncture 
between the basic components of the existing international system and the capacity of the 
dominant state or states to maintain the system, between the costs of defending the existing 
distribution of territory, spheres of influence, rules of the system, and international economy, on 
the one hand, and the revenues necessary to finance these arrangements. This divergence 
between costs and resources in turn produces a ‘fiscal crisis’ for the dominant power or powers. 
The consequence of continuing disequilibrium and of the financial drain it entails if it is not 
resolved is the eventual economic and political decline of the dominant power.”  A rising 87
economic power then typically takes advantage of the state of affairs and surpasses the declining 
power thus creating a new balance of power. 
Russia’s fall was perhaps more unique than others, as it was the endgame of an 
ideological war that had existed for decades. No expert or scholar foresaw the coming demise of 
the Soviet Union, although in hindsight scholars have noted several explanatory variables. One 
school of thought places the most emphasis on economic stagnation as causing the fall, whereas 
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another would highlight social and intellectual modernization as the cause.  Internal pressures 88
certainly played a role, as did the permittance of elections with a multi-party system which paved 
the way for democratization. The introduction of the policies of glasnost and perestroika were 
also considered integral to loosening the control of the authoritarian state over the market and 
over its satellite states. The failure to reform the market resulted in an accumulation of economic 
pressure that eventually became unsustainable. The outcome in 1991 was the end of an empire 
and the death of an ideology. The international bipolar system had ended and the balance of 
power shifted to the United States which then stood alone as the singular hegemon remaining.  
 
The Literature on Resurgence and the Middle East: 
While the literature is well developed on the topic of great power status and the moments 
in which states become great powers, there is a gap in the literature on the topic of “resurgent 
powers”. Although the term “resurgent Russia” is used frequently in headlines and news articles, 
the literature on resurgent states as a theme are scarce. The word resurgence is defined as “an 
increase or revival after a period of little activity, popularity, or occurrence.”  While the 89
aforementioned literature speaks to the rise and fall of great powers, it does little to inform us on 
the topic of “resurgence” or how great powers return from periods of ruin. Indeed, after Russia’s 
collapse, many labelled the nation as permanently deceased. Some prescient scholars, such as 
Bruce Porter, warned of the need to alter this mentality. Quoting Alexis Tocqueville, Porter 
reminds us that “the essential ingredients of state power over the long run provide a much needed 
88 The role of economic stagnation is examined by Vladimir Kontorovich whereas the role of social and intellectual 
modernization is considered by Francis Fukuyama in: ​Gvosdev, Nikolas K. ​The Strange Death of Soviet 
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corrective, for the ingredients ultimately matter more than economic fluctuations, political crises, 
or near-term shifts in the military balance.”   90
Only as the 21st century unfolded did the conversation surrounding “resurgence” begin to 
surface. In reference to Russia, it is clear that scholars, journalists, and experts are referring to its 
revived presence in the international system from a geopolitical standpoint. It is poorly defined 
in terms of precise, identifiable variables. Instead, scholars seem to refer to a general, identifiable 
trend of outward international aggression. Aggarwal and Govella defend their claim that Russian 
behavior is resurgent because they argue that the qualities of Russia’s current foreign policy is 
focused on bolstering Russia’s prestige, encouraging economic recovery, and extending 
influence into its “near abroad”.  Many scholars see this as an attempt to regain its lost great 91
power status as a distinctive marker of prestige and recognition.  
In beginning to redevelop its international prowess, the Russian government has looked 
to capitalize upon its regional geopolitical situation. Pertinent to Russia’s developing presence is 
the Kremlin’s interest in the Middle East, and how it has utilized its newfound power to 
capitalize on the current events occurring around its borders. Such interest has become so intense 
that it has become “the most active it has been since the heyday of the Cold War.”  The Middle 92
East is an integral geopolitical location in Russia’s resurgent objectives. This particular focus has 
much to do with the Middle East’s central location between Africa, Asia, and Europe, as well its 
enormous energy resources, and its volatile political instability in recent years. Russia has finally 
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succeeded in opposing the United States in its previously dominant role in the region. Indeed, 
“Nowhere did Russia’s reemergence on the world stage have more impact than the turbulent 
Middle East.”  The Middle East has been integral to Russia’s offensive foreign policy, 93
fomenting its resurge back into the international arena.  
Although Russia has worked painstakingly to rebuild its influence and standing in the 
region since the mid-2000s, its efforts only began to pay off meaningfully in the wake of the 
Arab Spring at which point Russia’s resurgence was imminent, only becoming more apparent 
during its combat deployment in 2015.  ​Most western critics have claimed that these changes are 94
the result of Putin being a “deliberately destructive player in the Middle East by manipulating the 
untraditional but potentially dangerous post-Cold War order to strengthen its own standing in the 
world.”  There is consensus that Russia often acts in an attempt to insert itself on the 95
international stage at the expense of the United States, its longtime rival, in a zero-sum game 
fashion.  Having been treated as an irrelevant player in 2003, when the United States decided to 96
invade Iraq, and then again in 2011 when the United Nations decided to depose Libyan leader 
Muammar Qaddafi, it is not surprising that the Kremlin has developed this zero-sum game 
mentality. Scholars label Russia’s foreign policy style in the Middle East as coming from a place 
of “pragmatism and political realism, characterized by a willingness to deal with all relevant 
players, treating no one wholly as an ally or wholly as an adversary...maintaining a clear focus 
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on Russia’s own national interests.”  While Russian officials often claim today that their main 97
concern stems from respect for human rights and international law, most are cognizant of the fact 
that this is most likely not true. Rather, scholars today mostly agree that while Russia puts efforts 
forth “to act under the guise of ‘humanitarian intervention’  and claims to endorse international 98
law and cooperation,  its focus is most likely more towards strengthening its international 99
prestige and to create a balance of power in the world, “despite all the rhetoric in Moscow of 
endorsing international law and cooperation.”  
Out of the variety of events that have occurred in recent years “Moscow in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century stood accused of passing on nuclear technology (Iran); illicit 
sales of advanced conventional weapons (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah); hindering UN Resolutions on 
the Security Council; political cover and support for terrorist organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah); 
and blocking peaceful democratic development (Syria, Lebanon and indirectly Iraq).  Russia’s 100
new role and identity had its roots in the late Yeltsin era, but the Putin era witnessed the 
emergence of an assertive Russia that by 2013 subtly deflated the balloon of US power by 
cleverly manipulating developments in the Middle East including Iraq, Lebanon, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian revolution and, other regional issues.”  Many scholars 101
agree that “Russia’s comeback in the Middle East is real and incontestable.”  102
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Aside from the current instability within certain regions of the Middle East, Russian 
statesmen have long prioritized the maintenance of strong relationships with the states which 
comprise the Middle East. There are a variety of factors that have contributed to this 
preoccupation. The first reason comes simply from the proximity of the Arab world to the 
southern border of Russia. The Russians often discuss this in terms of Russia’s “soft underbelly”
 an area that is often prone to be porous and less secure. Although there is some buffer from 103
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), these countries too are often exposed to 
permeable borderlines  thus creating a problem for Moscow. Having lost the former Soviet 104
state buffers, along with the rise of terrorism, has reamplified the need to secure the south. 
Russia’s worries have “long focused on the possibility that political instability in a neighboring 
country will involve Russia in violent unrest. Russia also fears that political change in those 
countries is a harbinger of instability to come within its own borders.”  The notion of 105
prioritizing the southern border was heavily popularized by one of Russia’s most famous 
statesmen, Yevgeny Primakov, who is credited with giving “a clear formulation of Russian 
foreign policy and the introduction of new ideas and directions during his tenure as Foreign 
Minister.”  Primakov, in particular, had been intent on emphasizing Russia’s greatness within 106
global affairs and had a particular interest in the Middle East after the immediate fall of the 
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Soviet Union, however his efforts were stymied by the domestic crises within Russia during the 
time, and so failed to enact much policy outside of Russia’s immediate borders.   107
Another natural reason for Russia to focus its foreign policy on the Middle East has 
historically been its desire to access warm water ports. Russia already has access to the eastern 
area of the Black Sea’s coastline, thus providing a waterway to the Mediterranean sea. However, 
Arab Meditterranean states “are located close to transportation lines crucial for Russian relations 
with the southern hemisphere, and they represent an important strategic interest to Moscow.”  108
The centrality of the eastern Mediterranean has been pertinent to Russian strategic thought since 
1770 when the tsars first gained access to the waters and it has remained a central theme of 
national interest since then.  Today, there is plenty of evidence which supports the claim that 109
“Putin’s Russia is determined to have access to the warm seas and the world’s oceans.”  110
The Middle East’s notoriety around oil, which has attracted foreign actors for decades, 
has also been a focal point of Russian foreign policy. Russia itself is one of the worlds’ major 
oil-producing nations and so communication between Moscow and top oil-producing states in 
the Arab states is inexorable. Currently, Russia and MENA “sit on 60% and 63% of the world’s 
proven oil and gas reserves, respectively, and produce half of the world’s oil and nearly 40% of 
its gas... Any cooperation between these two giant players will, therefore, have significant 
implications for global oil and gas markets.”  The potential for lucrative trade opportunities has 111
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created a strong incentive for Russia to focus on Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with whom 
Russia can have a stake in the international oil and gas economy.  
Another, less apparent fixation on the Middle East has to do with Russia’s expansive 
Muslim population. Russia is made up of about one hundred ethno national groups of which the 
Islamic community makes up more than 15 percent out of the entire population.  This 112
population has grown faster than any others within the Russian population and it has been 
coupled with a shrinking ethnic Russian population.  In comparison to EU member states, 113
Russia has the largest per capita of citizens who avow to being Islamic.  Although this is not as 114
prominently noticed as a factor for Russian foreign policy, “Russia, Islam, and Russia’s Muslim 
peoples have influenced one another for nearly a thousand years.”  This has become a more 115
prevalent concern for Russia in recent years, as the rise of groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS has 
resulted in an immense amount of terrorist attacks internationally. For example, Russia’s recent 
attempts to work with Iran has been both “because it provides them greater influence in the 
Middle East while also acting as a strategic buffer against radical Islam, a threat which is of great 
concern to Russia.”  Once fighting broke out in Syria, this became even more of a priority for 116
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Russian officials who feared that the return of battle-hardened Russian jihadists (which 
numbered up to 7,000 fighters) would return to the country and destabilize internal politics.  117
While efforts to improve relations in the Middle East have occurred since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, many note the most drastic changes following the events of the Arab Spring. 
Although Russia has worked painstakingly to rebuild its influence and standing in the region 
since the mid-2000s, its efforts only began to pay off meaningfully in the wake of the Arab 
Spring at which point Russia’s resurgence was imminent, only becoming more apparent during 
its combat deployment in 2015.  Most Western critics have claimed that these changes are the 118
result of Putin being a “deliberately destructive player in the Middle East by manipulating the 
untraditional but potentially dangerous post-Cold War order to strengthen its own standing in the 
world.”  Admittedly, there is quite a bit of consensus that Russia often acts in an attempt to 119
insert itself on the international stage at the expense of the United States, its longtime rival, in a 
zero-sum game fashion.  Having been treated as an irrelevant player in 2003, when the United 120
States decided to invade Iraq, and then again in 2011 when the United Nations decided to depose 
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, it is not surprising that the Kremlin has developed this 
zero-sum game mentality.  
It is also important to note that the majority of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the 
Middle East do not come from a place of camaraderie. Despite the lengthy history between the 
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regions, even during the reign of the Soviet Union, scholars admitted that, “Soviet policy 
towards the Arabs does not appear to conform with the traditional theory of alliances - rather 
than valuing the Arabs for any positive contribution or single military strength, it is more likely 
their weakness that has induced such Soviet support ...Arab political instability, social 
contradictions, economic deficiencies, and military vulnerability have been exploited by the 
Soviet Union to secure a wide range of objectives, of which strategic mobility is certainly among 
the most prominent.”  This claim was further supported by other research, which claimed, 121
“Moscow’s aims in the Middle East are the traditional aims of most great powers: to exclude its 
rivals from the area, to promote its foreign policy interests broadly, and to assure itself of the 
resources and strategic position essential to its security. All other aims, interests, and policy 
positions are subordinate to and derivative from these central aims. Moscow has no intrinsic 
interest in either stability or instability, peace or war, or, to take a more specific issue, a 
Palestinian state or none at all. Its preferences on these issues are subject to change, depending 
on its perceptions as to what will best further its core aims.”  Scholars label Russia’s foreign 122
policy style in the Middle East as coming from a place of “pragmatism and political realism, 
characterized by a willingness to deal with all relevant players, treating no one wholly as an ally 
or wholly as an adversary...maintaining a clear focus on Russia’s own national interests.”  123
While Russian officials often claim today that their main concern stems from respect for human 
rights and international law, most are cognizant of the fact that this is most likely not legitimate. 
121 ​Klieman, Aaron S. ​Soviet Russia and the Middle East​. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970. Print. Studies in 
International Affairs (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research) ; No. 14. P. 12. 
122 ​Ramet, Sabrina P. ​The Soviet-Syrian Relationship since 1955 : A Troubled Alliance​. Boulder: Westview, 1990. P. 
3 
123 Trenin, Dmitri “What Drives Russia’s Policy in the Middle East?”, in ​Popescu, Nicu and Secrieru, Stanislav, 
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Rather, scholars today mostly agree that while Russia puts efforts forth “to act under the guise of 
‘humanitarian intervention’  and claims to endorse international law and cooperation ,, its 124 125
focus is most likely more towards strengthening its international prestige and to create a balance 
of power in the world, “despite all the rhetoric in Moscow of endorsing international law and 
cooperation.”  
Analysis: 
Russia’s Military Interventionism:  
In terms of ​how​ Russia has succeeded in reinserting itself within the region, it has 
pursued a variety of foreign policy strategies. Amongst these, the most obvious has been 
Russia’s direct military presence in the region. The most poignant example of such military 
presence came in 2015 when Russia decisively committed itself to the Syrian civil war. Russia’s 
involvement has become its biggest combat employment since the Soviet-Afghan War, 
ambitiously launched despite not sharing a common border or having any kind of large 
independent support . While there was some vested national security interest involved, 126
specifically in preventing the aforementioned“battle hardened Russian jihadists” from returning 
home if the state failed, it is apparent to most in the international system that Russia’s 
involvement was entirely meant to demonstrate their renewed power. This marks the first direct 
intervention by both the United States and Russia in a military conflict with both countries 
putting troops on the ground, heightening tensions to a level that has been noticeably absent for 
several decades. Russia did not originally have specific interests in the country from an oil or 
124 ​White, S. (2006) Russia: diminished power. In: Fawn, R. and Hinnebusch, R.A. (eds.) ​The Iraq War: Causes and 
Consequences.​ Series: The Middle East in the International System. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO, p. 72.  
125 ​Nizameddin, Talal. ​Putin's New Order in the Middle East​. London: Hurst &, 2013. P. 5. 
126 ​Trenin, Dmitri. What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Polity Press, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/conncoll/detail.action?docID=5145619​. P. 31 
trade standpoint, nor was it in a position to expend a lot of resources.  Regardless of this, 127
Vladimir Putin made clear the fact that “Syria would be no Libya.”  Importantly, the 128
intervention cost Russia little, requiring some thirty to forty combat aircraft, approximately 
twenty helicopters, a few hundred mercenaries, and between 4,000-6,000 ground troops.  129
Estimates surrounding the cost of the military operation in the first 20 months lands around only 
$2.4 billion, an infinitesimal cost in comparison to the $50 billion annual budget of the Russian 
Ministry of Defense.   130
There are plenty of indicators of successful payoffs for Russia. the Kremlin’s decision to 
act unilaterally in the Syrian civil war broke it out of its political isolation and forced the United 
States to restore communication with Russian military personnel.  Furthermore, the operation 131
manifested considerable leverage against the United States, decisively returning Moscow to an 
important player in power politics. As a result of the Kremlin’s intervention, “There is no 
question that Russia’s relatively modest outlay of military power in Syria has paid off 
handsomely, and that the Russian military has largely run the show.”  What might have been a 132
quick U.S. or NATO intervention to remove Bashar Al-Assad from power became a long drawn 
out conflict between two strong, rival powers. In 2015, Assad only retained control over 
approximately one sixth of the country’s territory. By the spring of 2018, he held no less than 
127 Ibid. P. 32 
128 Ibid. P. 33.  
129 ​Weiss, Andrew S., and Nicole Ng. “Collision Avoidance: The Lessons of U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria.” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace​, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/20/collision-avoidance-lessons-of-u.s.-and-russian-operations-in-syria-pub-
78571. 
130 ​Lavrov, Anton “Russia in Syria: A Military Analysis”, in: Popescu, Nicu, and Stanislav Secrieru. ​Russia’s Return 
to the Middle East Building Sandcastles?​ Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2018. Chaillot Paper (Online), Nº 146, 
July 2018. P. 52 
131 Ibid. P. 49.  
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57% of the territory and had seized control over principle rebel stronghold.  In exchange for 133
Putin’s support, Damascus signed onto a deal promising Russia access to its air and naval bases 
for another 49 years.  This access has established Russia in a region far from home, giving it 134
entry into an airbase with air-bridges routes over Iran and Iraq, as well as a sea-bridge route to 
the Black Sea. Such lenient accessibility it considered unprecedented, especially in the case of a 
non-expeditionary military.  In the early stages of the war, Russia also secured the Khmeimim 135
air base in Syria, while also permanently settling into the naval facility in Tartus. Such 
integration in the region has allowed Russia to train military forces and it has also led to a further 
agreement between Russia and Egypt, permitting Russia to use Egyptian air bases when the need 
arises.  In 2017, reports indicated that Russia had potential plans to set up a base at the border 136
of Libya and Egypt, “ensuring that Russia ties itself to the energy and military sectors of many 
countries in the region, giving him leverage and influence.”   137
Another striking advantage for the Kremlin has been its ability to test new weapons with 
few casualties and train its personnel. Since the beginning of 2018, there has been a recorded 
number of 210 new weapons tested and evaluated in Syria.  Finally, Russia’s active role in 138
Syria has allowed “Russian military officers are able to hone their combat and tactical skills in 
Syria. They work in the country on short 2-3 month shifts. This has allowed me than 48,000 
133 ​ Lavrov, Anton “Russia in Syria: A Military Analysis”, P. 52.  
134 ​Ibid P. 53 
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officers and soldiers to acquire experience in Syria in the space of just two and a half years.”  139
By expanding down into the south, Russia has been given a window through which it can closely 
observe the strategic tactics of the United States, as well as its NATO partners. Such 
authorization has enabled Russia to survey western military technology, to gauge its 
effectiveness, and to compare it to its weaponry. This, along with the aforementioned 
advantages, strongly support the argument that Russia’s military presence has been pivotal in its 
reentry in world politics.  
The Role of Arms Sales: 
Military prowess has not been Putin’s only vehicle of renewed strength in the Middle 
East. Since the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has been known for its leading role in weapons 
suppliers which has historically been a point of great pride to the Russian people. It is well noted 
that “Russia has been one of the most active players in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region’s armaments market since the mid-twentieth century, using arms exports as an 
important policy instrument.”  During the 1970s, the Soviet Union became the main supplier of 140
modern weapons systems, offering training courses in Russian military academies, as well as 
having its military personnel and technicians serve as advisers to Middle Eastern armed forces, 
often in Egypt and Syria.  By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, it “was the single largest 141
supplier of conventional weapons to other countries.”  The importance of these arms transfers 142
139 Ibid. P. 53-54  
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141 ​Klieman, Aaron S. ​Soviet Russia and the Middle East​. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970. Print. Studies in 
International Affairs (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research) ; No. 14. P. 39  
142 Anthony, Ian “Russia and the Arms Trade”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University 
Press, 1998. Preface. ​https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI98An/SIPRI98An.pdf 
was that they helped to shape the balance of forces in regional areas, while also functioning as an 
element of military assistance programs which could help to achieve strategic objectives and 
trade deals. Once the Soviet Union fell, there was a sharp reduction in military expenditure, 
dropping between 40 and 50 percent between 1992 to 1995.  As the defense industry suffered 143
from both a lack of investment and domestic procurement, many companies were forced to 
liquidate leaving few suppliers left.   144
Today, Russia has looked to reinsert itself back into the limelight in its role of a 
prominent arms exporter and has made tremendous progress since its downfall in 1991. Moscow 
has now achieved the role of being the second largest arms exporter  in the world after the 145
United States. The Kremlin has looked to the Middle East to rebuild itself in this area as well, 
with the Middle East absorbing the largest share of Russian arms exports in 2017  with over 146
$15 billion worth of military hardware being exported.  The demand for arms in the Middle 147
East is expected to only increase, “driven by ongoing conflicts (such as those in Syria, Yemen, 
and Libya), the fragile security situation, and the threat of military confrontation between state 
and non-state actors. According to SIPRI, over the last decade, the region’s arms imports grew 
by 75% from 20% of the global total in 2009-13 to 35% in 2014-18.”  Although Russia lags 148
behind the United States  as the main Middle East weapons importer, Russia’s outreach has 149
only increased due to its contacts with Syria, Iran, and other states in the region. If one includes 
143 Ibid. P. 3-4 
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the North African countries in addition to the Middle East (MENA), then the region ranks as the 
largest recipient of Russian armaments accounting for almost 50% of the total from contracts 
with 23 MENA countries. In focusing just on the Middle Eastern countries, there are plenty of 150
examples of renewed Russian arms deals. In 2012, Iraq signed a package worth $4.2 billion, 
which at the time was Moscow’s largest arms deal in the region since the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution.  In 2014, Iraq became the second largest importer of Russian military equipment, 151
importing a variety of weaponry including Su-25 attack aircraft, TOS-1A heavy flamethrower 
systems,  Mi-28NE and Mi-25M attack helicopters worth 1.7 billion.  As aforementioned, the 152
military intervention in Syria has improved Russia’s ability to trade arms as it now has a 
platform within the Middle East to test drive and show off new weaponry. Another advantage of 
improving weapons distribution has been the fact that the Kremlin “has demonstrated that it is an 
important security actor in the MENA region which cannot be ignored.”  153
 
The Role of Diplomacy: 
Perhaps the most driving element behind both direct military intervention and trade deals 
has been Russia’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the region. President Putin’s 
diplomatic efforts to improve relationships within the region have been expansive, clearly to 
improve Russia’s soft power advantages. For example, in Iran, Russia has spent the last decade 
attempting to dilute sanctions against the state and has also aided in the development of a nuclear 
150  ​Borisov, Timofey “Russian Arms Exports in the Middle East” P. 38-39. 
151 ​Ibid. P. 40 
152 Ibid. P. 40 
153 Ibid. P. 41 
reactor in Bushehr.  By standing with Iran against the Western coalition, Russia has effectively 154
won widespread support by citizens throughout the Middle East who see the United States as an 
imperialist power in the region. The Kremlin has effectively capitalized on the waning influence 
of the United States’ soft power in the region, especially following the 2003 occupation of Iraq, 
to shift focus away from the West. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi has only just recently 
signed a strategic partnership with Russia, which would entail further expansion of arms trade, 
joint military maneuvers, and the promise to construct a nuclear power plant in Dabaa.   155
A more precise form of diplomacy that dominates the relationship between Russia and 
the Middle East is energy diplomacy. Energy diplomacy “typically refers to diplomatic and 
foreign policy activities conducted by a consumer country to secure access to energy resources 
from a producer country, with a view to ensuring ​security of supply ​… Energy diplomacy may 
also refer to efforts deployed by a producer country to secure access to markets with a view of 
attaining ​security of the demand...​The growing ​rapprochement​ between Russia and countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) encompasses the two forms of energy diplomacy. It 
is manifest in enhanced interaction and coordination among oil and gas-producing countries 
pursuing common interests...​”  Taken together, the region of MENA and Russia “sit on 60% 156
and 63% of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves, respectively, and produce half of the world’s 
oil and nearly 40% of its gas.”  Today, energy has become a primary factor of the Russian 157
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economy, as well as a primary tool for enacting foreign policy. In 2005 while attending the G-8 
summit, President Putin boasted that “Russia is the world leader in the energy market, with the 
biggest potential in oil, gas, and nuclear power taken together.”  It is indeed true that Russia has 158
become the world’s top producer and exporter of oil and natural gas, while also hosting the 
largest reserves of gas and uranium.”  The importance of these resources for Russia’s 159
international image has become clear by the fact that the official energy strategy of 2003 
explicitly mentioned these resources as a political instrument, as did the 2009 security doctrine. 
This has resulted in the total state ownership of oil companies including Transneft, which has a 
monopoly on oil pipelines, as well as Gazprom which dominates the gas market.  When the 160
U.S. sanctions came to fruition in 2014, Russia’s oil prices collapsed, resulting in a decline from 
$110 per barrel to less than $60 in just 6 months.  It was at this time that Russia heavily began 161
to work with Arab countries, specifically those in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) to improve its dire situation. In 2016, OPEC announced that it would 
coordinate a production cut, while also including Russia which, within a year, helped to 
restabilize the Russian economy, going from “recession to recovery” as well as the oil industry 
which bounced back to valuing oil barrels at $70 in just a few months.  By 2018, Saudi Arabia 162
had taken the further step to invite Russia to become an observing member of OPEC, deepening 
the relationship from its previous temporary status.  
Russia has coupled this style of energy diplomacy with investments funds that look to 
attract foreign funds into the country. For example, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, founded 
158  ​Kanet, and Kanet, Roger E. ​Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century​. ​P. 49-50.  
159 ​Ibid. P. 49-50 
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in 2011, has already attracted $30 billion of foreign capital into the local economy. This capital 
has come from partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA), Qatar Holding, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), and the DP 
World (United Arab Emirates-UAE).  Energy has overlapped with investments, for example in 163
the case of Rosneft who is also pursuing investments directly in “oil and gas projects from 
Algeria to Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and Oman, further building closer ties 
with various governments and local entities.”  Russia’s diplomatic return to the region has 164
ensured that “all geopolitical actors in the region engage with Russia and pay due respect to its 
interests.”  Such skillful statecraft has helped coin the phrase “playing a weak hand well” when 165
referring to how Russia has managed to exert so much power in recent years despite very much 
still being in a recovering stage. Although Russia is not yet the world player that it was in the 
Soviet Union, by capitalizing on its strengths Russia has put itself into a position of resurgent 
influence in the region of the Middle East.  
Conclusion:  
Although the resurgence of Russian power has worried Western powers, it should not be 
overstated. In spite of the initiatives that the Kremlin has pursued in regaining international 
prestige, Russia’s economy remains rather stagnant and it is unlikely that they will regain any 
kind of extraordinary military superiority in the near future. The Russian economy retains long 
standing constraints on growth, especially as a result of the sanctions implemented against them 
following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. The economy is weak in terms of diversification of 
exports, is highly dependent on imports of machinery and technologies, and is plagued by high 
163 Ibid. P. 33 
164 ​Ibid. P. 33 
165 ​Popescu, Nicu and Secrieru, Stanislav, ​Russia’s Return to the Middle East Building Sandcastles?​ P. 110. 
energy prices.  Moreover, the fact that many wealthy Russians keep their capital overseas 166
means that domestic investment remains low.  The chance of an offensive military operation 167
committed by Russia is highly unlikely, with NATO investing more and more into the defense 
systems of Russia's bordering Eastern European states. The Kremlin seems to also be aware of 
this, as they have implemented intensive measures towards developing their cyber capabilities as 
a means for asymmetrical warfare. Russia’s other issues, including deep seated corruption, 
population decline, and poor infrastructure, only further complicate its attempts to regain a great 
power status.  
Moving forward, the Russian Federation is likely to continue to invest resources into 
asymmetrical means of challenging Western dominance. In the absence of an ability to regain 
power through conventional means, the Kremlin will capitalize upon new spaces of power 
struggle such as the cyber world or through the weaponization of disinformation. In terms of the 
Middle East, Russia is likely to continue to eye it as an important geopolitical area for 
challenging Western supremacy, although will most likely not engage in any direct manner. 
President Putin will remain pragmatic in his involvement, only extending Russian resources into 
the region for clear economic or military return. Altogether, the efforts made by the Kremlin thus 
far to regain prestige have been slow and incremental at best, and do not indicate a return to great 
power status, in terms of economic or military might, at any point in the near future. 
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